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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OF THE ARMED FORCES ABROAD 
Gordon B. Baldwin 
My function, as I understand it, is 
to further your study of international 
law by supplying specific examples of 
how it helps, and perhaps hinders, 
your work. Your interests are practical 
and immediate while mine, as a 
teacher, are academic and more re-
mote. So I run the risk of c~nfirming 
Mark Twain's remark-"To do good is 
noble-to teach good is nobler, and no 
trouble. " 
Indeed, to practice international law 
is far more difficult than to teach it. 
You must respond to the demands of 
new situations, and the automatic 
application of old rules doesn't always 
work. Ancient history (which we find 
in some of our international law texts 
-Colombos' volume on the Interna-
tional Law of the Sea for example) 
may be uplifting, but history lacks 
relevance without knowing how it 
applies to your problems today. So, we 
all face a challenge-we, to teach some-
thing meaningful, and you, to learn 
something useful. This work!> the other 
way around too-you teach us, and we 
learn. Indeed, even after six years 
experience with the International Law 
Study, I always come to Newport like 
the empty coal car coming to New-
castle-hauling away more than I bring 
in. Your questions, your misgivings, 
and your commitment to our nation 
cnligh ten us and enrich our teaching at 
home. 
I am going to speak to you of the 
legal' problems of U.S. armed forces 
abroad as they relate to international 
law generally. If you're like your 
predecessors here at the War College, 
your immediate reaction to the phrase 
"international law" is ''There's no such 
thing." Just three years ago, Mr. 
Katzenbach, now the Attorney Gen-
eral, remarked during this international 
law study that he didn't see much 
point in debating the subject of 
whether international law existed, but 
that if he did, he'd be happy to debate 
either side. It all depends, he said, on 
how one defines law. If Mr. Katzen-
bach had argued that international law 
does not exist (and indeed he did not) 
he would be likely to lose, assuming 
we define international law in terms of 
what lawyers do, and if we define 
international law in terms of the tasks 
we commonly ask law to perform. In 
terms of what law does, international 
law relating to your operations in a 
foreign country is as real as constitu-
tional law, as criminal law, or as our 
traffic laws. What jobs does law do? 
Law, I suggest, fulfills four major func-
tions. Law creates rules for allocating 
rights to achieve scarce satisfactions. 
Law, secondly, establishes working pre-
sumptions. Third, law offers us a 
process for minimizing violence by 
placing in identified hands a legitimate 
monopoly of violence. It does this by 
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allocating competence to make authori-
tative decisions and the right to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction. Fourth, law con-
tributes a sense of legitimacy to those 
who follow the rules and the presump-
tions, and also to those who exercise 
authority. Those who are victims of that 
authority are more likely to accept it. 
Lefs start by discussing the rules. 
A great law teacher and constitu-
tional lawyer, Paul A. Freund, points 
out that one of the most successful legal 
inventions we have is the white line 
drawn down the middle of a highway. 
Generally motorists keep to the right of 
that line whether or not there's a 
policeman and whether or not they 
encounter traffic. It's the rare motorist 
who deliberately straddles the line. 
International agreements, such as the 
NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 
serve much like the white line down the 
highway. There are no policemen, but 
the NATO partners follow the rules in 
the treaty-for the most part avoiding 
head-on collisions. It has been a remark-
ably successful agreement, and its form 
is much imitated-even by the Soviet 
Union which has Status of Forces 
Agreements with East Germany and 
Poland .. 
In the NATO agreement we have 
some very precise rules pertaining to 
passport and visa regulations, driving 
licenses, uniform regulations, matters of 
claims, of taxation and of criminal 
jurisdiction. In the two-year-old. Status 
of Forces Agreement with Germany, 
additional rules relate to aerial photog-
raphy, hunting and fishing rights, use of 
the roads, port facilities, etc. 
We don't teach international law, or 
any other type of law for that matter, 
by asking you to learn a set of rules. 
There are too many of them, and 
reciting them doesn't give a systematic 
picture. You can have lawyers find 
them, or you can read the NATO Status 
of Forces Agreement, the German Sup-
plemental Agreement, the Japanese 
Administrative Agreement, various base 
rights agreements, with such countries 
as Spain, or one of our several naval 
visits agreements. These answer such 
questions as: 
1. Who commands a jointly used 
installation? 
2. What rights of entry to the base 
area do personnel of the receiving state 
enjoy? 
3. Who can arrest infractors of 
criminal law? Who can punish their 
criminal behavior? Does it make any 
difference if your men were on liberty 
or on leave when the offense occurred? 
4. Can the U.S. forces arrest or 
detain local inhabitants who in some 
manner interfere with the visiting force? 
What happens when one of your sentries 
shoots a native of the host country? Can 
we insist that he only be tried for any 
alleged offense by a court martial? 
5. Can the U.S. send anyone it 
pleases into the host country-or may 
the host country exclude Jews or 
Negroes? Can the host country impose 
curfew regulations, and prevent your 
men from fraternizing with local girls? 
6. What, if any local taxes should 
the members of the U.S. forces pay? 
Income taxes? Inheritance taxes? Taxes 
imposed to build roads? Radio and TV? 
Water services? 
7. What civil liability does the U.S. 
force or its members have? Are there 
any immunities? Who pays for the 
damage? 
8. What flag or flags can be flown? 
9. If inhabitants are hired, what 
provisions, if any, of local labor law 
must the U.S. follow? 
10. Who has authority to negotiate 
supplementary agreements and what 
powers are delegated to these persons? 
11. Who finances the construction in 
base areas? Who bears the cost of 
maintenance and of furnishing utility 
services? 
12. May post exchanges, post 
offices, commissaries operate? What 
privileges and duties are applicable to 
them? 
13. Who is responsible for the in-
ternal and external security of the area? 
14. What are the regulations respect-
ing the use of railroads, roads, dock 
facilities and airports? 
IS. Who holds title to fixtures, 
buildings and other structures con-
structed for the use of the visiting 
force? 
16. What goods can be imported, in 
what amounts, and what duties, if any, 
are payable? 
17. How and where can aircraft navi-
gate? 
These are only a few of the routine 
questions answered in some arrange-
ments we have with a receiving state. 
Good lawyers know that drafting to 
meet every contingency is difficult, and 
they find that to make day-to-day rela-
tionships work satisfactorily, detailed 
drafting isn't a solution. What is more 
important is to establish procedures and 
indicate the objectives of settlements 
that ought to he made. Lawyers on your 
staff ought to he able to do this. 
But lawyers can he troublesome. 
General Eisenhower thought lawyers 
were troublesome when, in 1943, he 
rejected a long, technical draft of an 
Italian surrender agreement suhmitted 
hy his staff. He preferred a short, terse 
surrender agreement leaving many issues 
hetween Italy and the allied forces 
undecided. Some think he was mis-
taken. However, we have ample evi-
dence that lawyers' documents can he 
awfully complicated. 
So many prohlems were anticipated 
in Germany, for example, that the 
agreements effective there in July 1963 
comprise over 200 pages of text. Nego-
tiating lasted nearly 10 years, what with 
one delay or another, and the result 
(like the fine print on the back of an 
insurance policy) is a formidable docu-
ment, complicated, turgid and legalistic. 
I suspect it's treated much like the 
standard clauses in some contracts. 
Lawyers draft them and the husiness-
men ignore them. Reading the German 
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Supplemental Agreement reminds me of 
one of the punishments inflicted hy 
Gilhert and Sullivan's Mikado: of the 
man sentenced to "listen to sermons hy 
mystical Germans who preach from IO 
to 4." Perhaps it is too detailed. On the 
other hand, it's possible also to he too 
hrief. The Japanese Peace Treaty con-
firming United States presence in 
Okinawa, for example, states that 
pending the estahlishment of some kind 
of United Nations trusteeship -there, the 
United States has "all and any powers 
of administration, legislation and juris-
diction." This is pretty sweeping, hut 
when Secretary of State Dulles re-
marked thereafter that, of course, Japan 
retains "residual sovereignty" over those 
islands, we authorize Japan's flag to he 
flown there and refrain from mounting 
a raid on Viet Nam from there. This 
only adds confusion. Admittedly an-
other treaty clarifying United States' 
rights in the Ryukyu Islands would he 
difficult to negotiate. Mayhe it's too 
late. However, the existing situation 
permits the Japanese to complain that 
their residual sovereignty is violated 
when occasionally we find it necessary 
to use 0 kinawa as a hase for B-S2 raids 
over Viet NaIll. My point is that more 
detail and less sweeping language in the 
Peace Treaty might have heen in United 
States national interests. 
Now let's note a second function of 
law, one more difficult to grasp, but 
more important; namely, its use to 
establish working presumptions. Law in 
any form and in every society performs 
a major service hy establishing presump-
tions which shift the hurden of per-
suasion hy suggesting that some values 
ought to he preferred. We have many 
examples: it's presumed a crime to 
intentionally kill another unless you can 
estahlish some justification; the oceans 
are presumed' free for all users, unless 
one of the users can establish very good 
grounds for excluding others. In our 
topic today the basic presumption 
seems to he that: the military or naval 
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force entering a foreign country is pre-
sumed subject to local law and is subject 
to the exercise of local enforcement 
authority unless it can establish some 
good @-:ounds for exemption. 
Law also supplies the machinery by 
which presumptions can change, and 
indeed it has changed here. In the 18th 
and 19th centuries visiting military 
forces in foreign countries were prob-
ably presumed exempt from the host 
country's authority. They were treated 
almost like diplomats. We have a famous 
old Supreme Court case articulating this 
presumption-the Schooner Exchange. 
But a lot has happened since 1812 when 
Justice Marshall rendered that decision. 
Foreign armies are no longer sporadic 
guests (our forces have been in Europe 
for over 20 years). Nationalism 
generates resentment against granting 
vast immunities to the visitors. The 
trend in international law is to inhibit 
anything that might be characterized as 
aggression and to encourage account-
ability for all official acts. Moreover, 
persistent Communist propaganda 
would have the world believe our forces 
are engaged in 'a military occupation of 
Japan, Western Europe, and the Philip-
pines. All these conditions have con-
tributed to developing a different pre-
sumption. When the NATO Alliance was 
being organized, both we and our allies 
wanted to make it absolutely clear that 
United States armed forces in friendly 
foreign countries were there as' allies, 
not occupiers; that we were partners 
with the host country in a joint enter-
prise, namely, the defense of Europe. 
Hence the presumption of immunity 
from the exercise of local authority, 
which we claimed during World Wars I 
and II, was changed by international 
legislation, the NATO Status of Forces 
Agreement. The Supreme Court of the 
United States in the 1957 Girard case 
confirmed the new doctrine in holding 
that members of United States forces in 
foreign lands are subject to the en-
forcement procedures of local territorial 
law, unless some specific international 
agreement or some specific rule of 
international law holds othenvise. 
It seems to me that many of us have 
mistaken the presumption, expressed in 
several other treaties, for an absolute 
rule. Indeed, when the NATO Status of 
Forces Agreement was submitted to the 
U.S. Senate for its advice and consent, 
the Secretary of Defense and the Secre-
tary of State solemnly declared that the 
agreement merely recited general inter-
national law in that the host country 
always retains territorial jurisdiction 
over the visiting United States force. 
More recently, I read a statement by an 
Army lawyer that the marines landing in 
Thailand a few years ago to help defend 
that country's border with Laos were 
subject to the enforcement jurisdiction 
of Thailand. This is a little hard to 
believe as it just doesn't make sense for 
a combat force, hastily admitted in an 
emergency, to have to submit to the risk 
that a local law enforcement agency will 
arrest members of the force for alleged 
criminal behavior. The suggestion of 
amenability to local law that we find in 
the NATO agreement, and in many 
others, is just that: a presumption which 
'may be, and has been, rebutted on 
several occasions. 
Underlying each international agree-
ment establishing a le'gal basis for our 
forces abroad is one of four different 
conditions, and to meet it the working 
assumptions articulated in law must, 
and do, vary. Let's look at the four: 
L The Peacetime Garrison situation, 
typical in Europe, Japan, and Australia: 
Here the supremacy of local law reflects 
reality. The visiting force is amenable to 
local civil and criminal law and to its 
enforcement unless the treaty indicates 
exceptions which usually relate to 
activities done in the course of officinl 
duty-not always an easy question to 
determine. In a peacetime or garrison 
situation, the visiting force does not 
require absolute immunity. They do 
require some assurance of what 
procedures and rules should be followed 
in the event of disputes, tax claims, 
criminal behavior, etc. And the host 
country can rightly insist that even if 
the visiting force is immune from cer-
tain enforcement jurisdiction that the 
force should nevertheless obey local 
law. 
ll. Where the visiting force functions 
as if they were diplomats: The agree-
ment of Viet Nam, negotiated in 
1950-51, for example, provides for U.S. 
military assistance, largely in the form 
of supplies and equipment, but it also 
covers people who might come to Viet 
Nam to help. These people "operate as 
part of the Diplomatic Mission" of the 
United States, and they are therefore 
entitled to one of three categories of 
diplomatic immunity. The agreement, 
between the U.S., France, Cambodia, 
Laos and Viet Nam, negotiated in 1950, 
hardly seems relevant today particularly 
in view of our undertaking that the 
number of persons receiving these privi-
leges "will be kept as low as possible." 
Diplomatic immunity is a valuable 
privilege intended to enhance interna-
tional communication. Its nature is well 
established by treaty and custom, but it 
can be waived, as it was in the recent 
unhappy Kimball episode in Viet Nam. 
Moreover, diplomatic immunity does 
not give its holders a license to flout 
local law. In fact, the modern trend is to 
require diplomats, like anyone else, to 
obey local law. Although they are 
exempt from local enforcement pro-
cedures, they run the risks of expulsion 
or being inconvenienced. New Jersey 
claims the right to escort speeding diplo-
mats off its toll roads, and I understand 
that the State Department is insisting 
that diplomats should follow traffic and 
parking regulations. 
Obviously the draftsmen of the Viet 
Nam agreement did not contemplate 
our sending 100,000 armed-to-the-teeth 
diplomats. Nevertheless, so far as I can 
determine, this is the only agreement 
published covering any of our forces 
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there. To_presume that t~ey are not 
only subject to local law, but also the 
exercise of local enforcement jurisdic-
tion, is absurd. The facts are that our 
forces are engaged in combat. What 
presumptions apply then? 
ID. The combat situation: A few 
weeks after the North Korean invasion 
of 1950, we negotiated a one-page 
agreement with South Korea stating 
that the United Nations forces there 
were exempt from arrest and trial by 
Korean authorities. Surely this agree-
ment merely articulated a preexisting 
presumption of immunity. The agree-
ment goes further, however-there's a 
curious provision stating that "unless 
required by the nonexistence of local 
courts, courts of the United States 
forces will not try nationals of the 
Republic of Korea." Does this mean 
that the United States might claim the 
right, in the absence of a-ftinctioning 
host country judiciary, to subject local 
inhabitants to trial by court-martial or 
military commission? This raises some 
interesting questions involving the inter-
play of the laws of war, the Geneva 
conventions and of the United States 
Constitution. We can make a case for 
that power, but I personally doubt 
whether that argument would be sus-
tained by the Supreme Court today, 
the Yamashita 1 Case, Madsen v. Kin-
sella, 2 to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Perhaps my colleagues could grapple 
with that problem. It may be a real One 
in view of the fourth situation. 
IV. The "Quasi-combat" or "peace-
keeping" situation. 
I don't know how else to charac-
terize the legal status of our forces in 
the Dominican Republic. Heretofore, 
foreign armed forces legally entered a 
country with either the consent of the 
host country, or at the behest of an 
international organization such as the 
UN. The United Nations in the Congo 
and in the near Eash-'have actually 
negotiated status of forces agreements. 
Quite aside from the issue of whether or 
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not any of these forces entered lawfully 
or not, the presumption favoring local 
jurisdiction is not applicable. There is 
no local jurisdiction by definition-the 
local order has collapsed-lives are in 
danger, and in the Dominican crisis the 
commander in chief made a political 
decision requiring you to prevent an 
intolerable Communist take-over. 
In this situation, we actually have a 
pair of complementary presumptions. 
One, to ensure that the host country 
must not interfere with the force's 
mission, we presume an immunity from 
the exercise of authority by anyone 
else. The second operating assumption is 
that the United States remains interna-
tionally responsible for the acts of its 
agents. Principles of state responsibility 
persist. If property is taken, it should be 
paid for; if inhabitants are hired, they 
must be compensated; if men are im-
prisoned, it must be through a process 
of law; and if force is asserted, it should 
be exercised responsibly and reasonably. 
Running deep in international rela-
tions is the theme that national power is 
accountable-that if unilateral action is 
taken, it must still conform to the 
demands of international law. This is 
certainly the United States position, 
restated regularly by the President, con-
firmed for you also in Navy Regula-
tions. Furthermore, it is a demand that 
we make of others. 
How do we operate with these pairs 
of presumptions in a military operation 
directed at "peace-keeping''? If you are 
planning one, you would be wise to 
include provisions for the settlement of 
claims. You have ample authority in 
United States law to do this under the 
Foreign Claims Act. You may recall that 
the Foreign Claims Act was passed by 
Congress in April 1918 to pay in-
habitants of France for damages caused 
to them by members of our forces. It 
was amended in 1943 and 1956 to 
permit payments up to $15,000 to 
foreign inhabitants. It is the authority 
for the payment for damages to real or 
personal property, to life and limb 
caused by, or incident to, noncombat 
activities of the armed forces. Damages 
are determined by local law, and natu-
rally will differ considerably from com-
parable damages in the United States. 
Careful and consistent use of the For-
eign Claims Act's provision may very 
well improve your relations with local 
inhabitants and counteract Communist 
propaganda. For example, I understand 
that in the Lebanon operation, olive 
groves were damaged by bivouacing 
marines: Olive trees grow slowly and 
may supply the owner's entire income. 
The Foreign Claims Act was used to 
compensate the owner for destroyed 
olive groves, with damages calculated 
according to local law. 
If you can distinguish between the 
presumptions of law and the rules of 
law, you may find international law a 
little easier to grasp. You must recog-
nize that applying presumptions to con-
crete problems can nevertheless be diffi-
cult; but it is also difficult to deal with 
problems without generalizations. We 
express the conviction in our legal order 
that decisions based solely on the 
appealing uniqueness of a human situa-
tion cannot supply the values or the 
continuity needed to give meaning and 
satisfaction. When we decide single 
problems, we look for general principles 
and for guides with some universal 
application. It is also true that we 
distrust large generalities as guides to 
our conduct, and put our fa.ith in 
wisdom and techniques learned by 
doing. Law, therefore, supplies a means 
for maintaining a creative tension be-
tween propositions and particular 
instances. 
The third function of law in my 
analysis is that law supplies a process for 
minimizing violence by placing in identi-
fied hands a legitimate monopoly of 
power. It does this by allocating com-
petence to make decisions. 
The risk of confusion and the threat 
of violence is substantial when the U.S. 
sends into the territory of another 
nation a pretty much self-sufficient 
body of men, capable of asserting enor-
mous power, subject to their own in-
ternal discipline, and carrying with them 
their own culture in the form of movies, 
post exchanges, and clubs. The host 
country is independent, with pride in its 
own culture, and its inhabitants may 
resent the strangers and their curious 
ways. 
We have in our own history several 
illustrations of these tensions. The 
"Boston Massacre" of 1770, for ex-
ample. You may recall that the offend-
ing soldiers were tried in a colonial 
court, defended by John Adams, the 
colony's leading lawyer, and they were 
acquitted. 
A second illustrative incident is the 
Thierchens case. Shortly before the 
United States entered World War I, we 
prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned 
the captain of a German Navy cruiser 
for smuggling, and also for a curious 
violation of the Mann Act. The Federal 
Court rejected the officer's pleas that he 
was immune from the enforcement 
jurisdiction of the United States. It's 
hard to reconcile the claim the United 
States made in this case with the com-
parable and contemporaneous Tampico 
incident involving the arrest by Mexican 
police of Admiral Mayo's barge crew in 
Tampico, Mexico. The men were 
eventualIy released, but Admiral Mayo 
demanded an apology and a salute to 
the United States flag. When the Mexi-
cans refused, he seized the port. 
These unpleasant incidents could not 
be prevented by an international agree-
ment, but the disputes which foIIowed 
could have been eased if some sort of 
status of forces agreement or a naval 
visits agreement existed. Accommo-
dation and compromise can be achieved 
in advance when you have a general idea 
of the risks, and you know what law can 
do. International agreements can con-
firm the right of a United States court-
martial to act in the host country, and 
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can make that court's authority exclu-
sive. The competence of the host coun-
try's police, judiciary, and tax authori-
ties can be outlined. The method for 
settling day-to-day tensions can be 
specified by claims provisions, liaison 
procedures, and other rules outlining 
mutual expectations. 
The sets. of compromises which we 
might call international law are worked 
out because participants think that the 
cost of continued disagreement is too 
great, and that the price paid in the 
form of some deference to the views 
and interests of others is acceptable .. 
The gains realized are less confusion, a 
diminished risk of violence, and the 
reasonable expectation that the other 
feIIow may, to gain similar advantage, 
behave similarly. We make international 
law because we hope to create condi-
tions in which the behavior of others is 
more predictable. 
Where international law does not 
serve mutual advantage, it becomes 
weak-even meaningless. Our status of 
forces agreement of 1950 with South 
Korea, for example, does not seem 
pertinent to the conditions there today 
(at least so the Koreans believe), so we 
have negotiated a new agreement. Quite 
rightly I think. Perhaps we have other 
international agreements affecting your 
privileges overseas which are also obso-
lete in that they appear to be one-sided. 
It's impossible to avoid renegotiation 
indefinitely. Therefore, treaties with 
perpetual provisions are probably not 
realistic. 
From all this you may quickly con-
clude that international law is merely a 
front in that "nations really do what 
they want to do." To this I reply, "Yes, 
but what nations want to do, that is 
what actions and policies they in fact 
foIIow, are very likely to be influenced 
by law, and by what lawyers say is law. " 
This is particularly true among the 
United States and its friends in the 
western world, hut even the Soviet 
Union and Red China use legal language 
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in supporting their own views and in-
terests, and what those views and in-
terests are, may well be conditioned by 
"law." Russia, for example, has nego-
tiated status of forces agreements.with 
Poland and with East Germany. I don't 
think Red China has any, but if they do 
place major units in Viet Nam, it would 
not be surprising if they did negotiate 
some sort of "status of forces" agree-
ment with Ho-Chi-Minh. 
The law of visiting armed forces is 
largely treaty law today. Its rules, pro-
cedures and legitimizing force is found 
in dozens of international agreements 
negotiated in the last 15 years. It is 
treaty law rather than customary law 
because of the fourth function of law, 
namely; that law "legitimizes." Law is 
valued not as an end in itself, but as a 
means to serve human life. Community 
consensus holds nations, and their offi-
cials, accountable for their use of 
power-however powerful the nation, 
and however high or insignificant the 
official, and however important the 
declared objective. When force is used 
so as not to serve human life, it is 
considered improper-illegitimate. A 
legal basis for the presence of the 
visiting force and legal grounds for its 
assertion of power, far from its national 
home, helps supply this sense of accept-
ance-this sense of legitimacy. 
Without a legal basis for the presence 
of forces, their activity would create 
more tension, more resentment and 
more confusion, both in the host coun-
try and in the United States. Aliens 
everywhere can be mistrusted; if they 
are armed, occupy valuable land, and 
occasionally exhibit the exuberance of 
youth, their presence can be divisive to 
an alliance. 
Without an international agreement-
without the consent of the host coun-
try-it is hard to justify a foreign base. 
When Zanzibar demanded that NASA 
dismantle the tracking station-we did 
so; when Morocco demanded that we 
leave our bases there-we agreed; and we 
apparently will also leave Libya. On 
occasion, we utilize overseas bases with-
out confirming international agreement, 
as in the Azores, for example, but 
nevertheless it is clear that we enjoy the 
consent of the Portuguese. 
A legal basis for the presence of 
visiting forces also helps here at home. 
For example, our decision to send 
troops into the Dominican Republic was 
unilateral. I am not concerned here 
whether that decision was wise or 
foolish. It is clear, however, that the 
firmer that decision rests in interna-
tionallaw, the more likely that decision 
will be accepted by the U.S. public, that 
elusive thing "world opinion," and by 
the Dominicans. It would make a neater 
legal case, for example, if the marines 
landed at the invitation of the host 
government. We could then persuasively 
claim with some justification that the 
Dominican situation was similar to the 
Lebanon crisis of 1958. Unfortunately, 
I gather that no one in the Dominican 
Republic with any color of authority 
wanted publicly to invite U.S. forces. 
So the United States' legal case must 
rest on more controversial grounds, 
and the legal basis is harder to de-
fine. 
If I have raised questions of the 
philosophy of law, I must apologize 
because about all I can remember of 
that subject is the definition of a 
philosopher-a philosopher is a blind 
man in a dark cellar at midnight looking 
for a black cat that isn't there. He is 
distinguished from a theologian in that 
the theologian finds the cat. He is also 
distinguished from a lawyer. The lawyer 
smuggles in a cat under his overcoat and 
emerges to produce it in triumph. 
So if I have given you a philosophy 
of law, this definition makes me a 
theologian. You could call me a lawyer, 
but if I were the type to smuggle 
something in, surely the War College 
would not invite me here. 
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NOTES 
1. In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), involved the war crimes trial of Gen. Yamashita for 
certain massacres and atrocities committed by Japanese forces under his command during World 
War II. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the United States Military Commission 
in Manila had jurisdiction to try Gen. Yamashita for those war crimes. 
2. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952), concerned trials in enemy territory which had 
been conquered and held by force of arms and which was being governed at the time by U.S. 
military forces. The U.S. Supreme Court held that in such areas the U.S. Army commander could 
establish military or civilian commissions as an arm of the occupation to try everyone in the 
occupied area, whether they were connected with the Army or not. 
---- \f1 ----
